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Part 1 – Setting the State Context
1.1. Decisions to Date
T
he rollout of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in West Vir-
ginia is a tale of two reforms. One is a story of how a state,
which was one of the earliest to adopt legislation for creat-
ing an exchange, decided instead to abandon plans for a state ex-
change and to passively participate in a federal-state partnership.
Thus did West Virginia go from embracing the exchange concept
to keeping an arm’s-length relationship with the ACA and the
Obama administration. The other is a story of how, after much
hesitation and trepidation, the state decided in the eleventh hour
to expand Medicaid. In doing so, it launched a proactive and ap-
parently successful effort to reach out to and enroll qualified indi-
viduals. The contrasts are clear and abundant and they tell us
much about the politics involved in health care reform and the
harsh practicalities and realities that states face in dealing with se-
rious and pressing needs and issues in health care services.
To understand the decisions that have been made to date, it is
essential to provide some political context. The past four years
have been some of the most dynamic in what has otherwise been
a rather stable state political environment, which has long been
dominated by a conservative Democratic Party. It is now argued
that a sea change is afoot, and that West Virginia is becoming a
red state.1 Two of its three House of Representatives members are
Republican. While both senators are Democrats, one, Joe Manchin,
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is conservative and has been a critic of the Obama administration.
The other, the soon-to-be-retired Jay Rockefeller, is an old-school
liberal who has been a champion of health care expansion for de-
cades. The state’s new attorney general, elected in 2012, is deeply
conservative and anti-Washington and is the only Republican in
the state’s plural executive that is made up of governor, attorney
general, secretary of state, and others. The Republican Party has
made significant inroads in the state house, and for the first time
in decades there is a real possibility that the Democrats will lose
power in the House of Delegates after the 2014 elections.
Whether a sea change is pending is still uncertain, but the po-
litical waters in the state are turbulent without question. Adding
to these complications have been changes in executive leadership,
which will add an intriguing chapter to the history of West Vir-
ginia politics. The state’s deliberations over the health insurance
exchange model occurred during one of the more dynamic (and
confusing) periods in West Virginia politics. The death of Senator
Robert Byrd in summer 2010 set into motion a series of political
events that saw the sitting governor, Joe Manchin, first appoint a
placeholder to the senator’s seat, then step down to run success-
fully in a special election to fill Byrd’s unexpired term, and then
successfully run for a full six year term in 2012.
When the governor resigned, a small constitutional crisis en-
sued since the West Virginia Constitution does not provide for a
lieutenant governor. Instead, succession fell to Senate President
Earl Ray Tomblin, who assumed office on an interim basis while
maintaining his Senate seat. The senator ran successfully for gov-
ernor in a special election to fill the unexpired term and then ran
successfully again for a regular term of office in 2012. During this
period, there was leadership change in the Office of the Insurance
Commissioner (OIC) and the Department of Health and Human
Resources (DHHR) — two of the agencies most vested in develop-
ing and implementing health care reform under the ACA’s
provisions.
Thus, the ACA emerged and unfolded in a state where Demo-
cratic leadership was concerned about inroads made by the Re-
publicans and was reluctant to be seen as too closely tied to the
Obama administration. In addition, it was considered during a
time of uncertainty over executive and party leadership. As a re-
sult, the ACA has not been warmly embraced by West Virginia’s
political leaders, but it has not been rejected either. Acceptance
has been qualified, conditional, and contingent.
West Virginia has currently elected to operate its individual
health insurance marketplace through a state-federal partnership,
in stark contrast to an original stance taken by state leaders. This
is the product of both political and practical circumstances. At this
juncture, it is appropriate to characterize the state as a “passive”
or “weak” partner in this arrangement.
Enabling legislation to establish a health benefits exchange
was passed into law in March 2011, and the state submitted a state
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partnership plan to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) in February 2013. West Virginia was the second
state, after California, to pass enabling legislation to create an ex-
change.2 While there was some initial interest in developing a
state-run exchange, the final decision was to enter into a partner-
ship.3 Originally called the Health Benefit Exchange, West Vir-
ginia’s program is now called the Healthcare Marketplace.
Development of the state health insurance exchange was
placed in the hands of the Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
The state received a $1 million federal planning grant in 2010. It
also received a $9.7 million Level One Establishment grant in 2011
to be used for program assessment, forecasting, and other plan-
ning functions.4 To assist in plan development, the OIC utilized
stakeholder meetings but did not establish a formal health insur-
ance exchange board as was authorized in the original state
legislation.
At the same time, the ACA’s fate seemed far from settled as a
result of U.S. Supreme Court challenges and continuing partisan
resistance to the new law. While West Virginia was not on the
front lines of this debate, resistance from conservative interests —
both Republican and Democratic —emerged in the state house.
Illustrative of this was the state’s response to one of the first
provisions of the ACA to be implemented — the Pre-Existing
Condition Insurance Program, known as for PCIP for short.
States had the option to administer their own PCIP or to allow for
federal administration of the program. West Virginia was one of
thirty-five states that already had existing state-operated high-risk
insurance programs that could serve as platforms for the new
PCIP. It was anticipated that the state would utilize its high-risk
program as the vehicle for PCIP implementation, and this ap-
proach appeared to have support in the governor’s office. How-
ever, it ran into opposition in the West Virginia legislature, and
plans for state administration of PCIP were abandoned. This
low-level conflict revealed deep-seated resistance to “Obamacare”
and the use of federal dollars to potentially fund abortions
(though it must be stressed that most high-risk insurance recipi-
ents are beyond childbearing years).5
As a result, West Virginia continued to operate its own
high-risk pool program at the same time the federal government
offered the PCIP program in the state. West Virginia extended
benefits for its high-risk beneficiaries through March 2014 as part
of a close-out process for its program and to ensure continuity of
coverage for policyholders, given the initial difficulties with the
federal web-based enrollment process.
Throughout 2011 and 2012, the state tentatively explored de-
velopment of a state-run insurance exchange. By April 2012, the
planning process had stalled. The exchange’s Board of Directors
had yet to be constituted. State officials expressed concern about
moving toward a state-run program due to technical complexities
and fiscal uncertainties. They also faulted the federal government
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for not providing clear and consistent guidance on exchange de-
velopment. The governor’s press secretary noted that it would not
be “prudent” to move forward while the constitutionality of the
ACA was being challenged in the Supreme Court.6
In June 2012, the OIC produced an analysis that recom-
mended against a separate state exchange “due to the projected fi-
nancial burden created from IT infrastructure/administrative
operations on the insurance industry, consumers, and state gov-
ernment.” The report also concluded that the relatively small
numbers of participants in the exchange did not warrant a sepa-
rate state system.7
By December 2012, it was clear that the state would be pursu-
ing the federal-state partnership option. The governor’s chief of
staff announced that this would be the most economical and
risk-averse approach given the continuing uncertainties of the
ACA’s rollout. State officials also reiterated the technical and fis-
cal difficulties of establishing an exchange in a small state with
limited resources. Participating in a state-federal partnership
would allow the state to hedge its bets and take a wait and see
posture toward future decisions on whether to join multistate
partnerships or to develop its own stand-alone program.8
On February 15, the state formally announced in a letter to
HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius that West Virginia would partic-
ipate in a state partnership exchange. In qualifying language tele-
graphing the state’s lukewarm embrace of the exchange, the
governor noted:
West Virginia retains the ability to modify the stated
intent to proceed in a State Partnership Exchange until
appropriate State analysis of forthcoming federal rules
and guidance occurs. In addition, the State will only pro-
ceed with SPE operations as long as sufficient federal
funding is available to cover all SPE costs. Furthermore,
West Virginia will continue to evaluate all available op-
tions concerning the Health Benefit Exchange as to en-
sure that the most fiscally prudent and consumer-
conscious approach is adopted in West Virginia.
The Health Benefit Exchange and other provisions of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will have
significant implications for West Virginia. My adminis-
tration is committed to maintaining the sound fiscal
stewardship that has been the hallmark of our State for
25 years. We are also committed to improving population
health so as to enhance the quality of life of our citizens
and to reduce the cost from poor health felt by families,
businesses, and taxpayers.9
In October 2013, a visitor to the state’s health care exchange
web page and affiliated websites was left with the impression that
implementation had been defaulted to the federal government.
There was little context to lead consumers to believe that this is a
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state-federal partnership. While the state is not actively resisting
the ACA’s exchange system, it is not actively embracing the
model either.
The case of Medicaid expansion is a much different story that
represents the advantages of having a broad-based coalition of
support for policy action. After deliberating on the political, fiscal,
and practical issues involved, the governor announced in May
2013 that West Virginia would participate in Medicaid expansion.
Throughout the late winter and spring of 2013, there was spec-
ulation as to whether West Virginia would participate in expan-
sion. In practical terms, expansion would mean reaching a
population that had long been underserved in health coverage.
Among the states, West Virginia has traditionally had very restric-
tive access to Medicaid for low-income adults without depend-
ents. For well over a decade, various study groups convened by
the governor had recommended expanding Medicaid to these
adults. However, continued concerns over program costs had
held back such action. Major players in the health sector had long
been supportive of expansion to help offset the costs of uncom-
pensated care. Over time, the state sought to control program
costs and not expand Medicaid to new populations. These deci-
sions were primarily the purview of the governor and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Resources. So, too, was the decision
to expand Medicaid, which did not require legislative approval.
Nonetheless, Tomblin held off announcing a decision on ex-
pansion until after the 2013 legislative session. Ostensibly, but
also genuinely, he needed this time to gather more information on
the fiscal implications of Medicaid expansion. A major report by
an actuarial firm that has long done business with state agencies
was commissioned. This also bought some time for the governor.
The probability was high that there would be bipartisan resistance
to Medicaid expansion in the state house given the ACA’s and the
Obama administration’s unpopularity. There was little reason to
stir a legislative hornet’s nest during a session that would either
challenge the governor’s decision or displace other items on his
policy agenda.
The governor was able to enjoy broad-based support for ex-
panding Medicaid in West Virginia. Health care advocates were
vocal in their support and conducted many meetings and events
across the state to advocate for expansion. Significantly, hospitals
were supportive of Medicaid expansion as was the state’s Cham-
ber of Commerce. Expansion was seen as a means of offsetting
charity care and reducing the number of uninsured. By moving el-
igibility for adults otherwise not qualified for Medicaid from ap-
proximately 25 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) to 138
percent of the FPL, significant gains could be made with minimal
short-term costs.
Rather than a quiet letter to HHS outlining the state’s plans for
exchange participation that received little attention or fanfare, the
governor trumpeted the Medicaid expansion in a news conference
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held at a major hospital in Charleston. Speakers at the news con-
ference included a representative of the health advocacy commu-
nity (a minister), as well as a hospital chief executive officer and
Senator Rockefeller.
The state’s Department of Health and Human Resources has
the lead role in Medicaid expansion. At both the secretarial level
and within its Bureau for Medical Services (BMS), Medicaid ex-
pansion has been made a high priority. Those applying for
Medicaid can do so through the federal exchange portal — but
most significantly, they can do so directly with the state by tele-
phone, web, or in person. Initial indications suggest a high
take-up rate for those newly eligible for Medicaid. As a press re-
port noted, the DHHR conducted immediate outreach efforts by
reviewing existing administrative files for people receiving ser-
vices who might also be eligible for Medicaid. As noted by a
DHHR official in October 2013, more than 40,000 requests were
made by this targeted population to enroll in Medicaid. This was
approximately one-half of the total anticipated enrollment base
that has been identified to enter Medicaid over the next three
years from this income group.10 The DHHR has achieved much of
this by contacting families receiving food stamps who would
likely qualify for Medicaid under its more generous income
eligibility provisions.
From a practical standpoint, Medicaid expansion is more im-
portant and relevant to West Virginia than is the individual insur-
ance exchange. According to an analysis conducted for the state
government, as of 2011 there were approximately 250,000 unin-
sured West Virginians out of a population of approximately 1.8
million. It was anticipated that with the implementation of the
ACA, approximately 85,000 to 90,000 new beneficiaries would be
added to Medicaid, bringing total enrollment to approximately
277,000 by 2016. For the same time period, it was anticipated that
the number of those in the individual insurance market would in-
crease from 28,000 to approximately 110,000.11 It was also antici-
pated that movement into the insurance exchange would be
gradual, while enrollment in Medicaid would be more immediate.
This seems to be bearing out given the high level of response to
Medicaid expansion in the state. Because of glitches with the fed-
eral web portal and reluctance by the Obama administration to
provide enrollment data, it was unclear what the application and
enrollment trends were in the individual marketplace during fall
2013. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that
Medicaid expansion applications and enrollment has already been
substantial in West Virginia.
1.2. Goal Alignment
West Virginia’s posture toward the ACA reflects the complexi-
ties in balancing pragmatic realities with political maneuvering. In
many ways, the ACA is a tale of two reforms in West Virginia. Af-
ter initial signals that the state would operate its own exchange,
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the state has backed off significantly from involvement in the indi-
vidual market health exchange. At present, individual market re-
forms, which include the individual mandate, are the most
contentious elements of the ACA and the features of health care
reform that are most closely tied to President Obama. As a result,
the Tomblin administration is keeping an arm’s length relation-
ship with the Obama administration. In essence, the state’s ex-
change is less a partnership than a default to the federal
government. This step back has been eased by the fact that the one
function of the OIC, to review insurance plans, has been simpli-
fied because there is only one carrier participating in the market-
place (Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield). This long-established
plan has traditionally dominated the individual insurance market
in West Virginia. In addition, the number of covered lives antici-
pated in the individual exchange will be fairly small. It is antici-
pated that approximately 110,000 West Virginians will be in the
individual insurance market.12
The ACA was an omnibus bill and represented a collection of
different provisions, mandates, and revisions to a broad array of
federal programs and policies relating to health delivery and fi-
nancing. On those points that touch on intergovernmental rela-
tions, West Virginia has neither been wholly oppositional nor
affirming in its response to the ACA.
Politics often trumps policy logic, but practicality usually is
the high card that trumps all. West Virginia elected to expand
Medicaid in order to reach vulnerable populations that would
otherwise not been insurable. As noted in a Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation study, West Virginia, along with Michigan and Ken-
tucky, stands to have greater benefit per capita from the ACA
than all other states. The Foundation estimates that “81 percent of
currently uninsured residents will receive some sort of financial
help in getting health insurance, either through Medicaid or
through subsidies in the health marketplace.”13
The state’s conflicted position on the ACA is perhaps best il-
lustrated in Washington, D.C., where the state’s two U.S. senators
stand on opposite sides of the merits of the Affordable Care Act.
Rockefeller, the state’s senior senator, has been a strident sup-
porter of ACA implementation and has been very public in his en-
dorsements. For example, he stood side-by-side with the governor
when the announcement was made that West Virginia would ex-
pand Medicaid. In an op-ed piece in the Charleston Gazette, the
senator emphasized that “I want to be clear — you can’t trans-
form a health-care system, especially one that’s as inefficient as
ours, in an instant. But I am confident that this is that path for-
ward, and that as legislators, we’ve got a responsibility to make
the law work the best it can for the well-being of the American
people.”14
In contrast, Manchin, the state’s junior senator and former
governor, has been a critic of the ACA in toto while providing
lukewarm support of specific provisions — such as Medicaid
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expansion. The senator did not make a public appearance at
Tomblin’s announcement and sent an aide instead. Manchin has
advocated for a delay of up to a year in requiring the individual
mandate, although key stakeholders in the state, such as health
care advocates and Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield (hereafter
Highmark) stressed that implementation should proceed or risk
undercutting the purposes of broad participation and increase the
probability of adverse selection into the individual marketplace.15
Part 2 – Implementation Tasks
2.1. Exchange Priorities
West Virginia was one of the first states to enact legislation au-
thorizing development of an insurance exchange. As previously
explained, political changes at both the national and state level
prompted state leaders to instead opt for a state-federal partner-
ship. As one of only seven states in a partnership, West Virginia’s
posture toward the exchange has been very passive. It is not an
active partner in the exchange relationship and limits its role to re-
viewing insurance carriers participating in the exchange. In com-
munications with the federal government, Tomblin has expressly
noted that the state would not publicize or market the exchange
and would leave these functions to the federal government.
2.2. Leadership – Who Governs?
In considering leadership, we must take into account politics
and role. A great degree of political calculation went into the
state’s adoption of the ACA through the state-federal partnership
and through the Medicaid expansion option. Politics continues to
play a role in shaping the attitude and posture of key elected prin-
cipals. We also need to take into account the different functions
that elective leadership plays in policy development, implementa-
tion, and regulation. Tomblin, a conservative Democrat, has both
embraced the ACA in terms of Medicaid expansion and distanced
himself from the ACA in terms of the state’s rather passive in-
volvement in the individual health insurance market. As noted
above, the two key agencies involved in state oversight of ACA
are the Department of Health and Human Resources’ Bureau for
Medical Services and the Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
The center of activity has shifted to the DHHR and away from the
OIC as greater emphasis is being placed on Medicaid expansion.
In addition, one the state’s top experts in the ACA moved from
the OIC to the DHHR to oversee Medicaid expansion. Previously,
he had been the chief facilitator and expert in exploring state
plans to develop a health insurance exchange.
Although the state legislature authorized the creation of a
Health Exchange Governing Board, which would have been com-
prised of ex-officio voting members from key public agencies, as
well as representatives from the insurance industry, health pro-
viders, and the public, the Board has not been established. In the
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present political and policy environment, it is unlikely that this
will move forward. The OIC retains the authority to review appli-
cations for Qualified Health Plans seeking to operate in the ex-
change. Initially, two well-established insurers were approved for
the marketplace. However, one of these, Carelink/Coventry,
which is owned by Aetna, withdrew from the marketplace.16 The
remaining insurer is Highmark, which has long been a major
player in the individual insurance market. In short, the OIC is cur-
rently playing a very passive role in the insurance marketplace.
Because West Virginia has a plural executive, it is not unusual
for top elected officials in the executive branch to be at odds with
each other. The state’s current attorney general has publically de-
cried “Obamacare.” Through regulatory authority, the attorney
general’s office has interjected itself into the implementation pro-
cess in a manner that calls into question the political motives of
the attorney general. Senator Rockefeller referred to the actions of
the attorney general as bullying organizations that might have an
interest in serving as navigators. As quoted in a newspaper arti-
cle, “Our attorney general, who hates all of this Affordable Health
Care Act, has intimidated one of the groups, so they’ve with-
drawn, and it is really something that should be investigated.”
The nonprofit in question had already received notice that it had
been awarded a federal navigator grant, but withdrew in the face
of scrutiny from the attorney general regarding queries into the
organization’s personnel and hiring policies and its capacity to
protect the private information of those it might serve in its navi-
gator role.17
2.3. Staffing
In terms of the health insurance marketplace, the state has in-
vested relatively little in staffing. Through 2014, it is using federal
funds to hire approximately up to 170 assisters who are stationed
primarily at local state-operated social service offices across West
Virginia. As of October 2013, approximately ninety assisters had
been hired.18 Within the OIC, no significant changes have been
made in staffing.
In the state’s Medicaid agency, the Bureau for Medical Ser-
vices, existing administrative and staffing structures have been
utilized to conduct outreach and enrollment. The state relied pri-
marily on mass mailings to inform potential enrollees that they
might be eligible for Medicaid. This was done by sending mail-
ings primarily to those in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) who were not eligible for Medicaid under the
old income standards.
An important footnote in the West Virginia experience is that
much of the knowledge about the ACA has been localized to a
few individuals. One of these individuals worked for the OIC dur-
ing the development of the state’s planning for its exchange op-
tions. Subsequently, he left to join the DHHR as the key staffer for
Medicaid expansion.
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2.4. Outreach and Consumer Education
Following the main narrative in this report, the state’s admin-
istrative posture toward outreach and education is a tale of two
programs. In regard to the individual insurance exchange, the
OIC has been passive in its activities. The OIC maintains a website
that is dedicated to the ACA, but navigating to it is not intuitive
and it includes the following disclaimer: “This site provides a re-
source for the public and other interested parties concerning the
planning and development of Marketplace policies and is NOT
the actual Marketplace for insurance purchases.” (However, the
site does host a link to the HealthCare.gov marketplace portal).
This posture is in alignment with Tomblin’s priorities, which were
communicated to Sebelius in early 2013, that “West Virginia does
not intend to develop a large scale marketing campaign promot-
ing the health benefit exchange. Additionally, West Virginia does
not intend to manage the day-to-day activities of the federal Navi-
gators.”19 As previously noted, West Virginia did not apply for
federal funds that would have assisted in outreach and education.
In September 2013, one senior state official quoted in a newspaper
interview noted:
The federal government has not adequately ex-
plained to the public what is taking place. This is a fed-
eral law and it is the responsibility of the feds to fulfill
this mission and for the most part this effort has been a
failure.20
The story of Medicaid is much different. Here the state has
been proactive and aggressive in reaching out to potential en-
rollees. Initial indications suggest a high take-up rate for those
newly eligible for Medicaid. The DHHR-BMS (Bureau for Medi-
cal Services) scoured its SNAP and other support services roles
to identify potential beneficiaries and contacted them by mail. In
doing so, the DHHR-BMS smoothed the application process by
inviting applications online or in person at local DHHR offices
across the state. As will be detailed later, the DHHR-BMS also
worked to ensure that those who got caught up in glitches with
the federal exchange website received assistance in applying for
Medicaid.
Outreach and enrollment activities are progressing on many
fronts. As a small, rural state, West Virginia has a surprisingly ro-
bust network of advocates and intermediary organizations that
are committed to encouraging enrollment. One group, West Vir-
ginians for Affordable Health Care, has a high degree of visibility
and credibility in state policy circles and among providers and cit-
izen groups. Apart from advocating health care reform for well
over a decade, it has also been involved in helping to facilitate
ACA enrollment in both the Medicaid and health insurance ex-
change. For example, it has disbursed $130,000 it received from
various foundations to provide mini-grants to health depart-
ments, churches, and community-based organizations to play the
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role of “community-assistors” who can help direct individuals to
more formal “individual assistors” and navigators.21
In other states, implementation of the ACA has been actively
resisted. In some places, this has been manifested in government
actions to impede the role of navigators and others involved in
outreach and enrollment. While the West Virginia governor and
state agencies are behind ACA implementation, especially the
Medicaid expansion, press reports suggest that the state’s new at-
torney general, who some would characterize as part of the tea
party wing of the Republican Party, has sought to block imple-
mentation. Among state legislators, criticism and concern has
been muted. In the 2014 legislative session, health care reform did
not surface as a major issue. Apart from traditional matters relat-
ing to nondiscretionary issues such as budget approval and pe-
rennial issues such as teachers’ raises, the legislative agenda was
displaced by a major environmental and public health crisis
associated with a chemical spill that affected much of the state’s
water supply.
2.5. Navigational Assistance
The initial implementation of the ACA has introduced us to a
new set of designations and terms for intermediaries who guide
and counsel people inquiring about and seeking enrollment in
Medicaid and the individual health insurance exchanges. For-
mally, these include what are called navigators, assisters, and cer-
tified application counselors. Informally, other parties have been
involved as well, such as insurance agencies and community-
based organizations and others that are assisting in getting word
out. There is not a tight hierarchical structure or coordinative
structure involved. In West Virginia, there are two crucial
observations to share:
1. Navigators are playing a limited role in the enrollment
process. Assisters and certified application counselors
appear to have a more active role. However, it appears
that all are concentrating on niche or target populations.
In addition, their roles tend to be reactive and focused on
those who are seeking medical services. A typical ap-
proach is to place eligibility workers in hospitals to help
patients apply for insurance — most likely Medicaid.
2. By far the most significant outreach and navigation
have been proactive efforts by the state’s Department of
Health and Human Resources’ Bureau for Medical Ser-
vices to contact those presumed eligible for Medicaid
and to provide easy pathways to enrollment through
mail and web-based application procedures.
State Responses: Assisters
The state has stationed assisters in forty-six field offices of the
DHHR across West Virginia’s fifty-five counties (some DDHR
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field offices serve multiple counties).22 There are mixed percep-
tions as to how proactive and assertive the state has been in set-
ting up the infrastructure of outreach and support for those who
would make use of the individual insurance market or who might
be eligible for Medicaid. In late October 2013, there were concerns
that the OIC was dragging its feet in hiring assisters and had
scaled back the number of hires it had originally planned to make.
At that time, the state had hired about eighty assisters and had re-
duced the number of hires from 270 to 170. This prompted criti-
cism by some in the advocacy community. The OIC defended its
actions by noting the federal government had taken up much of
the outreach slack through its various programs and grants to
nongovernmental entities. And a spokesman pointed out that the
office had received $14 million in federal funding for these posi-
tions and would apply all funds towards outreach and not return
any monies to the federal government by the time the grant ex-
pires at the close of 2014.23
Health Provider Responses:
Certified Application Counselors
In a rural, low-income state like West Virginia, one of the pri-
mary sources of health care is the state’s twenty-eight federally
qualified health centers (FQHCs). On the eve of the ACA’s imple-
mentation of Medicaid expansion and the individual health ex-
change, it was estimated that these FQHCs served 91,000
uninsured West Virginians. Through the West Virginia Primary
Care Association, these centers received $1.7 million in federal
funding to hire personnel to be “certified application counselors”
who help people navigate the new health system. These outreach
efforts also include “hosting health fairs” and “strategizing with
local staff members in the Department of Health and Human Re-
sources to help enroll people.”24 A good example of this function
could be found in a remote rural FQHC located in the state’s
mountain highlands of Webster and Nicholas counties, which of-
fered both phone counseling and in-person appointments in five
locations.25
The state’s two major tertiary hospitals —and their far-flung
health networks — have also gained status as certified application
counselor organizations. Their role has the potential to be highly
significant for directing individuals to Medicaid and the insurance
exchange. The Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC) has
twenty-three counselors to assist patients and their families. These
counselors have lengthy experience in helping “uninsured pa-
tients finance their care, but the counselors have undergone train-
ing from the federal government on the health insurance
marketplace.”26 In the northern part of the state, West Virginia
University Healthcare is also a certified application counselor or-
ganization. The counselors are explicitly focused not on outreach,
but on assisting patients to sign up for health coverage in the
event that they are uninsured.27
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The Limited Role of Navigators
As described earlier, establishing navigator functions in West
Virginia has been complicated by politics. The attorney general’s
pressure on one northern West Virginia-based nonprofit led to
that organization turning down a $365,000 grant to operate as a
navigator. This group, West Virginia Parent Training and Infor-
mation, Inc., withdrew based on inquiries from the attorney gen-
eral’s office regarding hiring and personnel practices — a move
that was soundly criticized by Senator Rockefeller.28 Another or-
ganization, Advanced Patient Advocacy, received a $276,000
grant at the same time, and two subsequent awards were made.
As various press reports have noted, these groups have been slow
to gain traction.29
Currently, the navigator role is being carried out by three or-
ganizations under a total of approximately $640,000 in federal
funding. One navigator is TSG Consulting, which is headed by a
past secretary of administration and a high-level lobbyist in West
Virginia. Located in Charleston, it has a portfolio of health policy-
related activities and communication strategies, but is a new-
comer to such work. A December 2013 newspaper article de-
scribed some of TSG’s outreach and education efforts, including
making presentations at local free clinics. The firm also hosts a
website to assist those making inquiries regarding Medicaid and
the individual health insurance exchange.30
The National Healthy Start Association, based in Washington,
D.C., received a $190,000 grant that it subcontracted to West Vir-
ginia University Health Systems.31 The West Virginia Healthy
Start Project focuses on eight counties in the northern part of the
state.32 The initiative has a special focus on serving expectant
mothers and newborns. Much of the service area is rural.
The other navigator, Advanced Patient Advocacy located in
Richmond, Virginia, received a $276,000 grant from Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and is placing navigators in
four hospitals across the state. It has a long track record of work-
ing with health providers to connect patients to publically funded
health insurance programs, thus offsetting their charity care costs.
Placing privately hired eligibility workers has become the norm in
many hospitals. The firm will place navigators in four significant
regional hospitals in the southern part of the state.
Informal Intermediaries
Outreach and assistance is being provided by informal inter-
mediaries as well. For example, an advocacy group, West Virgin-
ians for Affordable Health Care, has become the clearinghouse for
$130,000 in funding from various foundations and makes
mini-grants of up to $5,000 to assist churches, nonprofits, local
health departments, and others to serve as “community assisters”
to connect individuals to formal “in-person assistors,” who can
take on enrollment responsibilities.33
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Other nonprofits have been involved as well, often focusing
on specific constituencies. For example, a reproductive rights or-
ganization, WVFREE, established a website to encourage enroll-
ment by younger people.34
Another set of informal intermediaries are insurance agents or
brokers. While national media coverage has revealed how some
insurance agents have sought to take advantage of confusion in
health marketplaces across the country, there has also been cover-
age on the proactive role that agents are playing in the process as
well.35 In West Virginia, one press report detailed how agents
have assisted individuals and small business in providing infor-
mation about the ACA and the individual insurance market-
place.36 According to documents posted on the OIC website, as of
February 2014 there were approximately 330 insurance agents
who are CMS certified to provide market insurance assistance for
individual, SHOP (Small Business Health Options Program), or
both programs under the ACA.
The Big Story: Medicaid Expansion and Enrollment
As detailed throughout this report, the big story in West Vir-
ginia involves Medicaid expansion. By late October 2013, approxi-
mately 40,000 West Virginians had been added to the rolls
through expansion. The state started an aggressive outreach effort
in late summer to reach potential enrollees by reviewing SNAP
(food stamp) enrollment and caseload data for families where
children, but not parents, were receiving Medicaid. In the initial
phase of contact, 118,000 letters were sent out. The DHHR-BMS
invited enrollment through its website or through visits to county
DHHR offices.37 By December 2013, it was estimated that approxi-
mately 75,000 West Virginians had enrolled in Medicaid due to
the program’s expansion the previous October.38 By January 2014,
this number stood at 82,000, with another 10,000 likely to be en-
rolled immediately.39
It is estimated that by 2016 more than 133,000 additional West
Virginians will be covered through Medicaid expansion.40 We can
speculate that both formal and informal intermediaries will have
an important role in connecting individuals to Medicaid. It ap-
pears that the approach being used for both navigators and
in-person assisters will reinforce this. Many are based in hospitals
and they will likely refer low-income individuals seeking emer-
gency and primary care to Medicaid.
2.6. Interagency and Intergovernmental Relations
2.6(a) Interagency Relations. All agencies have their turf and
their interests to protect, but generally in West Virginia agencies
play well together. The two primary agencies involved in ACA
implementation are the Department of Health and Human Re-
sources’ Bureau for Medical Services and the Office of the Insur-
ance Commissioner. There is a mutual dependence on sources of
information and support from a stable of consultants, third-party
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administrators for billing and claims, and actuaries. The principals
in both the DHHR-BMS and the OIC know each other. As noted
earlier, one of state’s chief experts on the ACA moved from the
OIC to the DHHR-BMS and has been a principal architect in man-
aging the state’s Medicaid expansion.
The relatively passive approach to the health insurance ex-
change displayed by the OIC and the active involvement in
Medicaid expansion by the DHHR-BMS is a study of contrasts but
it is not a study of conflict. Both agencies seem to be on script in
carrying out the governor’s health reform agenda.
It is worth noting that OIC and DHHR-BMS are mutually de-
pendent on each other for outreach and enrollment functions. The
OIC is responsible for hiring “in-person assisters” and these indi-
viduals are primarily stationed at DHHR field offices found
throughout the state.
2.6(b) Intergovernmental Relations/2.6(c) Federal Coordina-
tion. Because West Virginia is involved in a state-federal partner-
ship for the insurance marketplace and because it has decided to
expand Medicaid, it is appropriate to respond to 2.6b and 2.6c
together.
Like other states, West Virginia experienced glitches and de-
lays with the implementation of the federal web portal for the
health insurance exchange. As mentioned in press reports, this
created significant challenges for people trying to access the sys-
tem. However, the state was able to provide an alternative for
Medicaid enrollment with its own outreach and enrollment sys-
tems. As reported in newspaper coverage, early on in the web cri-
sis a DHHR official noted that this arrangement, “had really been
a blessing….credit to the staff at DHHR for all the hard work they
did. It eases the burden on the consumer significantly and also
eases the burden on the state system.”41
2.7. QHP Availability and Program Articulation
2.7(a) Qualified Health Plans (QHPs). There is only one in-
surance carrier operating in the health insurance marketplace.
This is Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield, which serves West Vir-
ginia, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Initially, the OIC also ap-
proved Carelink/Coventry, which is affiliated with Aetna, for the
marketplace, but it pulled out of the exchange in September 2013.
In West Virginia, thirteen policy choices are being offered,
ranging from catastrophic coverage to “gold plans.” No high-end
“platinum” policies are offered. Eleven of the plans are state-spe-
cific; two plans are multistate options. According to an analysis by
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, exchange premiums in
West Virginia are among the lowest in the United States.42 As is
detailed in the discussion of government and markets later in this
report, there are concerns that a lack of competition might prove
counterproductive.
According to press releases posted on the OIC website, in Feb-
ruary 2014 Highmark announced enrollment figures of individuals
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who purchased ACA-compliant individual coverage. In West Vir-
ginia, 11,937 had done so, with 8,711 using the exchange and the
remainder dealing directly with Highmark. This represents a 57
percent increase in new members for Highmark.
2.7(b) Clearinghouse or Active Purchaser Exchange. West
Virginia does not operate its own exchange, and instead relies on
the federal insurance marketplace.
2.7(c) Program Articulation. Writing from the vantage point
of February 2014, it is interesting to note how West Virginia had
to fill in gaps and adapt to complications in the rollout of the fed-
eral exchange information and enrollment process. In essence, the
state decided to move unilaterally to ensure that potential
Medicaid enrollees were aware of their opportunities to apply for
benefits. In January 2014, the state launched an effort to make cer-
tain that 18,000 West Virginians who had slipped between the
cracks due to a lack of inoperability and sufficient data transfers
were given assistance in applying for either Medicaid or insur-
ance. Specifically, DHHR-BMS officials noted that the federal ex-
change did not provide adequate information to the state to
process some 10,000 Medicaid applications. Conversely, there
were difficulties in the state transferring information from 8,000
ineligible Medicaid applicants to the federal exchange. Officials
have expressed optimism that these glitches can be worked out.43
As noted elsewhere in this report, because of the difficulties
associated with the federal web-based enrollment process, the
OIC authorized the extension of benefits for the state’s high-risk
pool beneficiaries through March 2014.
2.7(d) States That Did Not Expand Medicaid. West Virginia
expanded its Medicaid program.
2.7(e) Government and Markets. In essence, the individual in-
surance market has been reformed through the ACA to provide
“guaranteed issue” for those with pre-existing conditions and has
been regulated to reduce disparities in rate-setting based on age
and sex. This is essentially an incremental adjustment of policy
that has been underway for some time in the private insurance
market. (Many states, especially in the Northeast, have had guar-
anteed issue regulations in lieu of high-risk insurance pools for
years.)
Highmark, the only insurer participating in the state ex-
change, has traditionally been the largest insurer in the individual
marketplace. On the eve of the launch of the exchange, it already
covered approximately 70 percent of those in the individual mar-
ket. Individuals can still purchase insurance outside of the mar-
ketplace that meet ACA underwriting requirements. However, if
potential beneficiaries qualify for subsidies, purchasing outside of
the exchange will work to their disadvantage.
While press reports note that the Highmark plans are among
the least expensive in the country, the presence of only one insur-
ance carrier in the individual exchange has been a concern for
some. One concern is that by dominating the market, the carrier
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might be able to dictate terms of negotiated prices with health
care providers.44 As a senior state administrator quoted in a
newspaper article noted:
One proposed benefit of the marketplace was to le-
verage competition amongst issuers to drive premiums
down in the market. Absent competition, this effective
market driver will no longer exist, and instead the mar-
ket will depend on regulatory mechanisms to ensure pre-
miums are at adequate levels. This is far from ideal and
fails to capture one of the initial proposed benefits sug-
gested by the federal government.45
In another news article, the state’s attorney general was
quoted as saying, “West Virginia needs more competition in the
health insurance market. Is a one insurer health exchange the
change we have been waiting for?”46
2.8. Data Systems and Reporting
The cost, complexity, and the administrative burdens of infor-
mation technology (IT) functions for a state exchange system were
explicitly cited as a reason why West Virginia moved to a fed-
eral-state partnership option.47 The state relies on its existing
Medicaid management information systems, especially its in-
ROADS system, for Medicaid eligibility and enrollment data. The
DHHR’s management information systems were also used as a
means of identifying potential Medicaid enrollees through an
analysis of SNAP and other public assistance program enrollment
data.
Part 3 – Supplement on Small Business Exchanges
3.1. Organization of Small Business Exchanges
Delays and deferral at the federal level means that small busi-
ness exchange activity has been limited in terms of policy atten-
tion and implementation in West Virginia. According to the
federal exchange site (HealthCare.gov), enrollment in the ex-
change cannot be done via the web and instead relies on interac-
tion with brokers, agents, or insurance carriers.
Approximately 300 insurance agents or brokers in West Vir-
ginia have been ACA certified by CMS. The vast majority of these
individuals are certified for SHOP enrollment activities.
The small business exchange has not had much visibility in
West Virginia. Undoubtedly, the policy uncertainties surrounding
SHOP at the federal level resonate at the state level as well.
Part 4 – Summary Analysis
4.1 Policy Implications
The implementation experience to date (February 2014) con-
firms some of our longstanding knowledge and assumptions
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about policy implementation in an intergovernmental context, but
also highlights some dynamics that are more specific to the ACA
and contemporary politics. Here are some general policy implica-
tions that bear further study and assessment in the months ahead.
 The ACA implementation experience in West Virginia and
elsewhere reminds us of our longstanding appreciation
that implementation is difficult; the devil is in the details.
The troubled rollout of the federal health insurance mar-
ketplace gives proof to this. These difficulties had real con-
sequences at the state level. As detailed here, in West
Virginia this resulted in approximately 18,000 individuals
not being properly matched to Medicaid or to insurance
options on the health exchange.
 Related to the point above, the ACA implementation expe-
rience in West Virginia also illustrates how state officials
and administrators can be nimble and adaptive in the face
of adversity. Like a number of other states, West Virginia
decided to adjust and adapt to the slow rollout by extend-
ing health coverage for individuals in the state’s high-risk
insurance pool. This was decided even though the state
had planned to cease operation of its high-risk program as
of January 1, 2014. The extension was made out of a con-
cern that both providers and policyholders would face
hardship in a gap of coverage.
 One of the most interesting storylines to appear in the
ACA implementation narrative involves intermediaries —
those formal navigators, assisters, and community assister
organizations, as well as informal parties who help guide
individuals as they negotiate the new insurance and
Medicaid landscape. In West Virginia, much of this func-
tion appears to be focused on more specific populations
and paths than on a more general approach. Thus, most of
the state’s in-person assisters are assigned to local welfare
offices and are enrolling individuals primarily in
Medicaid. The three entities that have received federal
navigator funding have essentially carved out niches and
targets for their operations. One is focusing on expectant
mothers and newborns; another is focusing on placing eli-
gibility workers in a few hospitals that will help guide pa-
tients to insurance coverage; still another is involved in
relatively passive outreach and education efforts in rural
West Virginia. Informal intermediaries are also concentrat-
ing on specific populations. What is most notable is that
many of these are engaged in enrolling individuals, most
likely for Medicaid, only when a precipitating event moti-
vates the individual to seek health services and thus cover-
age. This is not unfamiliar to those who study and work in
the world of Medicaid, as on-site enrollment and eligibility
intermediaries have long been a feature of major health
care settings like hospitals.
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 As noted throughout this report, West Virginia’s experi-
ence is a tale of two reforms or experiences. The state has
adopted a hands-off, but nonhostile, posture toward the
health insurance exchange. Unique policy and political dy-
namics contributed to the state first embracing the concept
of its own exchange and then moving toward a very pas-
sive role in a state-federal partnership. In contrast, the
state has been proactive in reaching out and enrolling
those newly eligible under Medicaid expansion. As ACA
implementation gains traction and best practices are dis-
covered and shared, West Virginia’s aggressive approach
of utilizing SNAP enrollment lists as a means of reaching
potential Medicaid applicants may be one of those stories
that come to the fore.
 State-level attitudes and perceptions toward the ACA and
Obamacare cannot be explained by politics alone. West
Virginia is a red state masquerading as a blue state in
macro-level analyses and descriptions of American politics
— especially in the fly-over states. Yes, the governor is a
Democrat, all but one of the state’s elected executives are
Democrats, both the House of Delegates and the State Sen-
ate are dominated by the Democratic Party, and both U.S.
senators are Democrats. However, West Virginia is a very
conservative state. Many of these Democrats are on record
as having reservations about the ACA. West Virginia has
not voted Democratic in a presidential election since Bill
Clinton’s reelection in 1996 and has had tense relation-
ships with the Obama administration over environmental
regulation. By many accounts, one would expect the state
to be oppositional — but it is not. Practical needs rule the
day, as is clearly demonstrated in the state’s expansion of
Medicaid.
 More generally, the ACA experience suggests the emer-
gence of a new type of federalism, which might be called
“Hedge Your Bets Federalism.” This operates on both the
state and the federal level and the implications can be
problematic. At the state level, there was very much a
wait-and-see approach as to whether key provisions of the
ACA would be deemed unconstitutional or would be
amended in the interregnum between March 2010 and Oc-
tober 2013. Yet at the same time, many of the smaller
pieces of ACA needed to be implemented. Few states
rushed forward. Somewhat reminiscent of the wait for
clarifying federal regulations during the implementation
of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
program, the states were also reluctant to create the ad-
ministrative infrastructure of reform. Yet a stark difference
is that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act and TANF seemed to change the cli-
mate of public assistance programming and implementa-
Managing Health Reform West Virginia: Round 1
Rockefeller Institute Page 19 www.rockinst.org
tion, whereas the ACA appears to be overly sensitive to
surrounding administrative and political conditions.
Hedging your bets meant not expending political capital
or public finances for something that might not materialize
in the end.
At the federal level, oppositional forces hoped for
deliverance either through court action or the electoral cy-
cle. The Obama administration appeared too fearful and
timid about pushing the implementation schedule for fear
of political losses at the ballot box. What is particularly in-
teresting about the hedging approach to federalism is the
soft infrastructure that has accompanied the rollout of the
ACA. In West Virginia, this has been manifested in (1) reli-
ance on existing administrative structures for Medicaid ex-
pansion; (2) deferral to the federal government to operate
the exchange and to thus shoulder the burden of responsi-
bility; (3) confidence that word will get out through inter-
mediaries with tangential ties to government — links that
have been created either through contracts or mutual in-
terests; (4) down-to-the-wire policy decisions about ex-
change options and Medicaid expansion; and (5) an
attitude of contingency, best expressed in the governor’s
February 15, 2013, letter to the HHS secretary noting that
West Virginia still reserved the right to change its mind as
implementation progressed.
4.2. Possible Management Changes and
Their Policy Consequences
The initial months of ACA implementation do not suggest ma-
jor management changes on the horizon. Both the OIC and the
DHHR-BMS have been actively involved in ACA implementation.
The former clearly defined its regulatory role, but has also shown
flashes of innovation and resolve by extending health coverage for
those in the state’s high-risk pool and by toeing a hard line against
revisiting rating and underwriting standards in the wake of
Obama’s U-turn on applying ACA standards to individual insur-
ance products. The DHHR-BMS has been proactive in reaching
out to potential beneficiaries under Medicaid expansion. While
there has been some criticism of the OIC for not being more ag-
gressive in hiring in-person assisters, the general impression is
that the state has been effective in handling Medicaid expansion.
While anecdotally there has been some discussion among individ-
ual legislators to create a stand-alone state exchange to clean up
the mess that Washington has made, this is unlikely to gain
traction.
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